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Introduction

In the Australian state of New South Wales judges have sat under the coat of
arms of the British monarchy since the nineteenth century (figure 1). Having
been accustomed to seeing this symbol over the course of many years doing
research in New South Wales courtrooms I was surprised to notice, during some
research into the physical form of courts in 2000, that a different coat of arms had
appeared above the bench in a new court building. This was the State arms of
New South Wales. This change had been officially introduced into new
courtrooms by an executive decision in 1995, in the midst of a controversy over
Australian republicanism and allegiance to the British monarchy. Further
developments saw a bill supporting the use of the State arms introduced into the
New South Wales Parliament in 2002, and the whole matter referred to a
parliamentary committee which took public submissions on the subject and
reported in December 2002.
In January 2002 Aboriginal protestors removed the Australian coat of
arms, which features the native kangaroo and emu, from the old Parliament
House, located in the centre of the national capital, Canberra. They objected to
the use of sacred animals on the symbol of Australian government sovereignty,
while this government does not recognise the prior rights and sovereignty of the
Indigenous people of the continent.
These events provide the cultural background and framework within which
I interpret the meanings of these contested coats of arms. Coming across these
contemporary contests over coats of arms in a short space of time, I became
interested in the meaning of these ancient and obscure symbols. They offer the
possibility of investigating the ways in which meanings change over time. This
investigation in turn suggests some insights into the relationship between signs,
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their objects and their interpretive context. Coats of arms have the quality that
they endure over long periods of time, as a result both of their formalised
specificity and their material existence. While the sign remains (physically) the
same, the context in which it is interpreted and hence its meaning can change.
The process of interpreting a sign may be understood through the context
of meanings by which a sign is connected with various other cultural
manifestations. The changing cultural, social and political context refigures the
the meaning which we attribute to a sign. In other words, its meaning depends
on the associations, cultural contexts and broader meaning frameworks by which
we interpret it. Some of these contexts derive from referents to other words,
symbols and objects. In the case of heraldic symbols these may be well
documented, if not widely understood. For instance, the harp on the British coat
of arms refers to Ireland, by long historical association.
In the pragmatic semiotic tradition signs can also be understood by their
effects. Following Peirce, Eco observes that we may best understand a military
command by observing how the troops respond to it (Eco 1976a). Likewise, we
can find valuable clues to the social role of signs by considering the uses to
which they are put. The process of connecting the sign to various other
meanings is a complex semiosis which may expand infinitely.1 Since this cultural
context changes over time and between cultures, situations where meanings
change or are contested are particularly instructive for semiotic research. The
following discussion examines the changed and contested meanings surrounding
some unchanging physical symbols. Their meaning is considered from the point
of view of their cultural referents, including both antecedent associations and
actual or intended effects.

1

'At this point there begins a process of unlimited semiosis, which, paradoxical as it may be, is
the only guarantee for the foundation of a semiotic system capable of checking itself entirely by
its own means.' (Eco 1976b, 68)
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The cultural specificity and political salience of these interpretants draws
attention to the social dimension of interpretive communities. In social semiotics,
we may gain considerable insight into different people's interpretations if we can
analyse the cultural baggage they bring to bear on an interpretive task. Looking
at the New South Wales coat of arms (figure 2), classically trained lawyers may
read the Latin motto, while Indigenous people may recognise the kangaroo as a
sacred totemic animal. Neither of these interpretants may be in the least relevant
to the issue of republicanism which, from another point of view, may appear to
drive the recent debate over courtroom symbolism. This discussion leads
through the various ways in which coats of arms are interpreted and used in the
context of New South Wales law courts, to conclude with some reflections of the
different ways they may be interpreted. It is suggested that a discrepency
between the cultural associations of particular signs and their pragmatic impact
may present a ‘gap’, or a certain obscurity, which may in itself have semiotic
significance.
The value of coats of arms as objects of semiotic study derives from their
physical existence and their old and well documented provenance. Physical
objects persist over long periods of time and may acquire various different
interpretations. Coats of arms exist in many physical forms, etched into metal, or
made of painted iron or wood. More recently they have taken new forms, such
as plastic film or bytes on a government computer server. They follow ancient
conventions of heraldry, and they may depict mythical beasts or long past events
as well as more modern conventions.2 The original interpretive context of
heraldic symbols of ancient origin may well be quite obscure to contemporary
observers. So they are notable both for their persistence over time and for their
semiotic obscurity. However, as will be seen, they also come to be invested with
different meanings as a result of changing historical contexts and political
2

The old coat of arms of the Basque province of Gipuzkoa depicts cannons seized in a battle in
1512. (Mohr 2001). On the other hand, submissions to the Standing Committee on Law and
Justice (2002) proposed that the New South Wales coat of arms be ‘updated’ is ways discussed
below.
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projects. The meaning of coats of arms may be understood by their history, by
the political contests to which they are enlisted, and by their impacts within
particular social settings. To the extent that there is a hiatus between the ancient
referents of coats of arms and their contemporary political and social roles, it is
possible to investigate the part played by obscurity and endurance in their
interpretation.

Lost traditions

To try to 'read' any of these coats of arms in a literal sense leads to several
difficulties. We find their languages–visual or verbal–obscure. What are we to
make of these lions and kangaroos; of old French and Latin mottos? Even if we
understand the words, some of the mottos seem to make little sense, and convey
no sense of the power they wield or any apparent meaning of the symbols. A
natural response to this obscurity is to try to understand the interpretive
framework of the time and mentality which created them. There are cues to this
and it is possible to discover quite a lot of their original referents, some of which
are considered below. I also inquire into the shifts of meaning which they same
symbol can undergo in moving to a new context in time and in place.
First I will consider the content of the two coats of arms which are the
subject of the New South Wales Government's change of courtroom symbolism,
and the Legislative Council's Inquiry into Regulating the Use of Coats of Arms in
New South Wales.

6

Figure 1
British Royal Coat of Arms displayed in a NSW courtroom (c 1880s)

The coat of arms of the British monarchy, currently still displayed in most
courtrooms in the State, depicts animal and floral emblems of the constituent
'nations' over which it rules in the British Isles. For instance, the lion and the rose
are English; the unicorn and thistle, Scottish. The Irish get a harp and a
shamrock, while the Welsh must make do with the Prince of Wales.3 'Honi soit
qui mal y pense' is written on a garter (naturally) because it is the motto of the
Order of the Garter. 'Dieu et mon droit', at least, makes sense to a legal
semiotician. The possessive tells us that the monarch is the source of right, and
whatever the connective 'et' signifies exactly, she is obviously connected in some
way with God.
Experts in heraldry who gave evidence to the Inquiry into the Use of Coats
of Arms in New South Wales pointed out that the British monarch has distinct
arms in her capacity of Queen of Scotland and of Canada. The arms used in
New South Wales courts are those of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (as can
3

'The special position of Wales as a Principality was recognised by the creation of the Prince of
Wales long before the incorporation of the quarterings for Scotland and Ireland in the Royal Arms.
The arms of the Prince of Wales show the arms of the ancient Principality in the centre as well as
these quarterings.' The Monarchy Today, http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/page400.asp website of
the British Royal Family, accessed 22 April 2002. In evidence to the public hearings of the NSW
Standing Committee on Law and Justice (12 August 2002), Michael McCarthy put it less
delicately in referring to the bloody English conquest of Wales, by comparison with the merger of
the English and Scottish kingdoms.
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be seen by the symbolic references to those places). One witness, Michael
McCarthy, maintained that arms are ‘territorial and specific to certain places
only’. In his view, to use British arms in New South Wales is to risk the most
populous Australian state being mistaken for ‘one of the lost counties of England’
(evidence,12 August 2002). On the other hand, the Garter King of Arms (the
chief officer of heraldry in England) maintains that this coat of arms is the ‘Arms
of The Queen as Sovereign of Australia: they are used throughout the
Commonwealth where The Queen is Head of State.’ He adds that Scotland and
Canada are exceptions.4
These interpretations of the Royal coat of arms may have been available
to the educated classes at the time of its inception, hundreds of years ago, and
still exercise a few heraldic experts today. However, as I am emphasising in this
discussion, the interpretive world we live in, and over which this coat of arms may
still preside, has changed. When I discussed this research with a magistrate
from South Australia, another state where the Royal coat of arms is displayed
above the bench, he told me of a fellow magistrate who had been sitting in a
remote South Australian town. There he observed that an Aboriginal child who
was appearing on a criminal charge had his gaze fixed throughout the
proceedings on the ornate coat of arms above the bench. The magistrate
hearing the case concluded that this symbol was making a profound impact on
the child. Whatever impact this object of rich colours, mythical animals and an
unknown language had on the child, it would have had nothing to do with the
interpretants or semiotic framework of the originators of the symbol. Through the
continuing processes of colonisation to the other side of the earth, that symbol of
British unity and Royal power has persisted and been transported into a
completely different interpretive world.

4

P Gwynn-Jones, Garter King of Arms, to F Nile MLC, 8 May 2002.
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Figure 2
New South Wales Coat of Arms, from the Government's website (2001)

The New South Wales coat of arms, which the State Arms Bill 2002 NSW
proposes should replace that of the monarchy, is of comparatively recent origin
(1906). There are Australian symbols (the kangaroo and the stars of the
Southern Cross) and the British lion. The economic bustle of the brash young
state comes across in the symbols of agricultural prosperity (wheat and sheep)
and the self-congratulatory motto ('Recently risen how brightly you shine'). It has
only been in the past generation that the primary industries depicted here have
been overtaken by tertiary ones. Even though education now earns more foreign
currency than does wheat, and Sydney is a centre for foreign currency exchange,
it may be demeaning to have the sheafs replaced by an academic ‘mortar board’
hat, and the sheep by dollar signs.
Here I have presented interpretations of the coats of arms which I am
discussing based on historical research and a little translation from Latin. From
this analysis we can see that a lion represents England, a unicorn, Scotland and
the whole arrangement represents the British monarchy. These interpretations
are available to the scholar of iconography or heraldry, but have little resonance
with the interpretive frameworks of the majority of citizens of New South Wales.
However, the conflicts and polemics over these symbols suggest that they may
be viewed at another level.
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Political projects

The polemics associated with these coats of arms, and the alternative versions
discussed, indicate that people are identifying these symbols with particular
causes. As the State coat of arms is enlisted in support of a republican
campaign, the British coat of arms is seen as royalist. Despite their sometimes
obscure and ancient symbolism, they have meanings of another type. These
cannot be read by simply delving into the historical origins, but must be deduced
from the contemporary contexts in which the symbols appear, and from the
disputes which they represent.
These disputes are about sovereignty, allegiance, and ethnic identity. In
New South Wales a republican project seeks to replace one symbol,
representing Royalty, by another which does not. Reaction to this move
emphasises an embattled British heritage threatened by multiculturalism. In
drawing attention to the prior sovereignty of Australia’s Aboriginal inhabitants,
Indigenous interests have objected to the cooptation of indigenous animals for a
colonising project.
The courts in New South Wales (the first Australian colony) have
displayed the Royal coat of arms since they were empowered to do so by the
King of England in the 19th century. With one anomalous exception, they did so
until at least 1995, when the State Premier proposed a number of changes aimed
at modernising the referents of executive power. The Premier, Bob Carr,
represents the Labor Party which campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum
of 2000 on Australia becoming a republic. While he has sometimes played down
the republican motives behind his 1995 moves regarding references to the
Crown (in the face of criticism), they must be seen in the light of this recent
Australian political history.
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Although the last legal and constitutional ties to British institutions were
severed by the Australia Act 1986, the Queen of England remains the Australian
Head of State. In fact, the responsibilities of this office are carried out by a
Governor General who is appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the
Prime Minister. However, the continuing ties to the British monarchy constitute
an irritation to Australian republicans, and a comfort to monarchists and
Anglophiles. Changing these arrangements requires a constitutional amendment
to be achieved by approval of a majority of voters in a majority of states in a
referendum. Changing the Australian Constitution is difficult at the best of times,
for procedural and socio-political reasons. On the question of Australia
becoming a republic, a variety of constitutional reforms was canvassed. At a
minimum, a constitution would need to specify a process for selecting a
President. Republicans were split between popular election and appointment by
the legislature. The referendum on a ‘minimalist’ republic with an appointed
President was defeated in 2000. Some of the passions behind this symbolic
move may also be seen in the debate over the New South Wales coat of arms.
Similar constitutional arrangements apply to the Australian States such as
New South Wales, with heads of State called Governors appointed by the Queen
on the advice of the head of government, who is called a Premier. The role of
and many of the references to the Queen are largely symbolic. When the New
South Wales Premier Bob Carr introduced the Oaths and Crown References Bill
into Parliament in 1995 he was explicit in his reference to republican sentiments.
This bill, he said, was intended ‘to make a number of symbolic changes to
remove some of the obvious and significant references to the Crown in State
legislation and administration.’5 Accused by opponents of representing
‘republicanism by stealth’, the bill was defeated in the Parliament.

5

Second reading speech 23 May 1995. Hansard p 50-51.
www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/lahans51.nsf?open accessed 21 June 2001
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The bill did not mention the Royal coat of arms in courtrooms. The
Attorney General (the Minister responsible for the courts) raised this issue in a
letter to the Premier accompanied by seven pages of advice from the State’s
Solicitor General. The Attorney General, Jeff Shaw, proposed,
In light of the Government’s moves to remove references to the monarchy and
the Solicitor General’s advice on this matter it would seem preferable for the
State Coat of Arms to replace the Royal Coat of Arms in New South Wales court
rooms.6

The Premier agreed to replace the Royal coat of arms with those of the
State ‘over time, whenever refurbishment of the various court rooms takes place.’
7

Courts built or refurbished since 1995 were to have displayed the State coat of

arms, but usage has been inconsistent. Currently all New South Wales courts
display a coat of arms behind the bench, and very often at the entrance, but this
may be either the State or the Royal coat of arms.
The most interesting source of considerations regarding the appropriate
symbol of the court’s authority can be found in the Solicitor General’s advice.
Taking issue with arguments in favour of the Royal coat of arms in other
documents, the Solicitor General, Keith Mason (1995) made several points in
support of its replacement:

• the historical and outdated nature of references to the State’s “British heritage”;
• the independence of Australian and New South Wales laws from those of
Britain, initiated by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (UK) and established
finally by the Australia Act 1986 (Cth);

6
7

J W Shaw, Attorney General, to R J Carr, Premier, 10 July 1995.
R J Carr to J W Shaw, 31 August 1995.
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• the provision of the 1986 Act that “unless Her Majesty is personally present in
New South Wales, Her powers and functions are exercised by the Governor, on
the advice of the Premier”;
In response to a view that the Royal coat of arms signified the
independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers, the Solicitor General
concluded, “The judiciary is indeed an independent and separate arm of
government. But it is nevertheless an arm of government of New South Wales.”
(Mason 1995, 5-6)
This is a succinct statement of the social, legal and political sources of
judicial authority: it is to be in line with our culture and heritage; it represents the
source of laws and the executive power which enforces them; and it is
represented as an arm of that same government, while being independent of it.
Submissions to the Public Inquiry into Regulating the Use of Coats of
Arms in New South Wales raised several other issues, many of them relating to
the referents of the symbols.8 Submissions opposing the use of the State arms
couched their concerns as a defence of British traditions. While several
submissions decried the State Arms Bill as a form of “creeping republicanism”9 or
“republicanism by stealth”10 – they were typically keen to protect British heritage
rather than the monarchy as such. They opposed multiculturalism, “Britain
bashing”, and “vandalism against British heritage”. One suggested that the
government should devote more attention to “re-establish law and order amongst
ethnic communities”. Another referred to “the liklihood [sic] that yet another part
of the Anglo-Celtic culture is to be wiped out, ie the Coat of Arms from all
buildings”, and asked, “is the English language to go, also??”

8

Forty nine submissions were received by the Public Inquiry between March and May 2002. My
references are to those submissions, all of which were made public by the Committee. I have
identified the source of those submissions made on behalf of a named organisation.
9
Submission of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy.
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Those in favour of the State arms sought more appropriate local
references. The New South Wales coat of arms includes a kangaroo and the
stars of the Southern Cross, as well as the lion and symbols of a colonial
economy. Several submissions called for a redesigned coat of arms. For
instance, George Poulos of the Australian Iconography Foundation advocated
that the State arms should be “more intrinsically New South Welsh”; they should
be non British and possess “intrinsic unequivocal State uniqueness”. As an
example he suggested that the dexter lion rampant guardant might be replaced
by the distinctive Australian duck billed monotreme, a platypus rampant. The
submission of the Flag Society of Australia stated, “The current state arms
portray sufficient symbols of European provenance, but none specifically of the
original peoples,” and cited several local and territorial government arms which
do.
This too could be contentious. Aboriginal representatives have opposed
the use on Australian arms of indigenous animals which have a special
significance and totemic power. Australia Day, 26 January 2002 marked the 214th
anniversary of white settlement, and the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment
of an Aboriginal Embassy in front of the old Parliament House in the heart of the
national capital, Canberra. A distinguished Aboriginal leader wrote, under her
preferred nickname Mum Shirl (1995, 117) that this Embassy “was to mean that
we were treated as strangers in our own country.” During celebrations to mark
the embassy’s thirtieth anniversary, protestors removed the Australian coat of
arms from the old Parliament House. That coat of arms has an emu as well as a
kangaroo. Kevin Buzzacott, one of the protestors, called for the removal of these
native animals from the coat of arms. He suggested replacing them with more
appropriate introduced species, such as a monkey or a rabbit. “It’s about taking
back what’s ours. … These judges, these coppers … are trying to use our sacred
animals for their power, their mad power.” (Brine 2002, 1)

10

Submission of Rev. Fred Nile, Christian Democratic Party.
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The power of the object

Why is it that coats of arms, as physical objects of ancient origin, come to be
associated with sovereignty and state jurisdiction? Do they bring any additional
authority to the government, court or political project which they represent?
Apart from the traditional symbolism of these objects, their physical presence in
places of power suggests they may play other roles. Having considered, above,
some of the historical associations of these symbols, and their enlistment in
political projects, I now turn to another aspect of the effects of these symbols.
It appears that in New South Wales court rooms the physical presence of
coats of arms invokes authority. The coat of arms is always displayed above the
judge or magistrate. In older courts this was often on a canopy which projected
out from the wall above the judge (as seen in figure 1). In newer courts it is
usually on the wall behind the judge so it is seen above his or her head from the
body of the court. The coat of arms occupies a unique place in most New South
Wales courtrooms as the only ornament or symbol. Unlike the courts of many
countries, there are no flags and no portraits or pictures of any kind. What is
more, the position of the coat of arms unambiguously identifies it with the power
of the judge. Controversy over the State Arms Bill mainly surrounds the use of
the coat of arms in courts.
The power of this symbol has been noted in two official documents and
has further been suggested to me by magistrates. A New South Wales
magistrate who generally sits under the Royal coat of arms said that it represents
the authority which the community invests in the magistrate.11 Referring to a
copy of a document which he had been involved in drafting, and which he
endorsed, headed “Standards of Court Design”12 we may find a slightly different
interpretation: the (Royal) coat of arms indicates “the sovereignty of the court”
11
12

Interview, 2 February 2001.
Undated photocopy, probably from the 1980s.
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(4.6). The Solicitor General finds that the New South Wales coat of arms
represents the independent and separate judicial power of the government.
Magistrates, the Solicitor General and a group responsible for drafting
court design standards have found various diverse sources for the power of the
coats of arms: that of the community, of the sovereignty of the courts’ power, or
of a separate judicial power of the State. These interpretations reflect the
symbolic position of the coat of arms above the judge. However, whether they
are referring to the State or the Royal coat of arms, and whatever the source of
the power they see it as symbolising, all identify the coat of arms with power:
One of the motivations behind the State Arms Bill appears to be the
profusion of coats of arms in New South Wales courts. While it was approved
practice until 1995 to use the Royal arms, a major refurbishment of several
courts in 1975 used the State arms.13 Since 1995 heritage buildings use Royal
arms, while new buildings use State arms. At least one major refurbishment
since 1995 has used the Royal arms.14 The Chief Judge of the District Court
wrote to the Public Inquiry into Regulating the Use of Coats of Arms in New
South Wales,
I advise that the criminal business of this Court is conducted, under the present
constitutional arrangements, on behalf of the Crown. For that reason, it is my
view that the coats of arms as presently used are appropriate and the use of the
State coat of arms would be inappropriate.

The submission was written on letterhead bearing the New South Wales coat of
arms.
In furnishing every court with one or the other coat of arms above the
judge it is clear that interchangeable symbols are made to do the job of invoking
13

Level 5, Downing Centre, Castlereagh Street.
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the authority of the court. Whether the symbol is the Royal or State coat of arms,
and however it is interpreted, it takes the same place and is seen to be
indispensable to the exercise of judicial power.
How is it that the coat of arms, whether that of the British monarch or that
of the State of New South Wales, acquires this power? What is apparent about
the coat of arms is its presence, whatever it represents. In the spatially loaded
but iconographically sparse New South Wales courtroom the coat of arms is
powerfully conspicuous, simply by being there: there, above the judge’s head.
The use of a particular symbol is decided by practice, or occasionally by some
controversy, and continues by custom. As a physical object, the coat of arms is
an enduring presence over time. It appears that a physical object conveys
messages rather differently to other signs, particularly verbal ones.
Some of these differences may be observed by comparing the ways in
which the New South Wales Government and the Parliament have approached
the different issues of the physical coat of arms and the verbal judicial oath. The
1995 decision to change the coat of arms in New South Wales courtrooms was a
relatively informal process compared with that required to change the oath or the
other references to the Crown, proposed by the Premier around that same time.
The Oaths and Crown References Bill 1995 failed to pass into law, and New
South Wales judges still swear allegiance to the Queen even though they may
now sit under the coat of arms of the State. In legal terms, this is explained by
the fact that the use of one or another coat of arms was a simple executive
decision not requiring legislation.
The current inconsistency in the use of various coats of arms shows that
executive decisions can be ignored by members of the executive government,
especially if they are advised by the head of the jurisdiction for whom they are
building or refurbishing courts. The introduction of the State Arms Bill 2002 by a
14

Land and Environment Court, Mena House, Macquarie Street.
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private member of the Legislative Council calls attention to an otherwise quiet but
incomplete process. In response the Legislative Council referred the bill to its
Standing Committee on Law and Justice, in the hope of gauging public reaction
rather more carefully than in 1995. The possibility of quietly introducing the new
physical coat of arms, and of then using an earlier version on various occasions
may be compared with the formal legislative change to the judicial oath, drawing
attention to the weight which that legal system places on words compared with
visual symbols.
The difference in fortunes of the verbal oath and the physical coat of arms
points to some interesting aspects of the use of symbolism and text in
contemporary law. The words of the oath can be written out and debated by
legislators. The coat of arms is more elusive. Its meanings are more
ambiguous, its presence perseveres over time in a particular place. However, it
is not an event enacted at a specific point in time like the swearing of an oath.
Gagliardi has suggested that these are characteristics comon to physical objects.
The possibility that artefacts evade censorship depends on two intrinsic features
present in different measure in the various artefacts: the tendency, proper to
matter, to endure over time – something not always easy to manipulate – and the
characteristic they have of being "ornament", of being "innocent forms",
apparently without influence on the "important things" which are said and done.
(Gagliardi 1990, 26-7)

The persistence of the Royal coat of arms in most New South Wales courts is an
example of this endurance over time. The decision to change to the State coat of
arms was made relatively easily–they were more “innocent” than the wording of
an oath–but the objects will last for many decades. Hence, as Pasquale
Gagliardi points out, physical objects have qualities of innocence as well as
endurance. Their innocence, in his terms, derives from their lack of explicit
influence on important utterances and actions. This in turn derives from the facts
that objects are inert (and thus not active) and their meanings are inexplicit, or at
18

less amenable to exegesis than texts. The meaning of the coat of arms is all the
more obscure through its tangential reference to ancient interpretants. A judicial
oath of allegiance to the Queen is more explicit than a coat of arms in the court
room because it uses the English language to pledge that allegiance. It is more
immediate since it is spoken in the here and now–in “real time”–it is a current
commitment rather than an enduring presence. Apparently the coat of arms as
a physical object acquires power from both these qualities, of endurance and of
obscurity.

Obscurity

Australian lawyers commonly believe that the obscurity of the symbols of the
common law adds to their mystique and to the authority which they wield. This
viewpoint was illustrated in my earlier discussion of the magistrate who believed
that an Aboriginal child was suitably impressed by the coat of arms. Lawyers of
a more modern or critical persuasion find these arcane ancient symbols,
including the wigs and gowns of many Australian judges and barristers, to be an
embarrassment: the law should be expressed in plain English and lawyers
should dress like anyone else. Even a distinguished Aboriginal leader, Mum
Shirl (1995, 121), invited to the Prime Minister’s Lodge, was turned away by this
symbol of authority.
I looked around the outside a bit; it was a big and fancy place, and I was curious
about it. When I walked in, though, there was this big coat of arms and it didn’t
feel like a house at all, so I just turned around and walked right back out of
there.15

15

Mum Shirl here describes her arrival at the Lodge in response to an invitation from the Prime
Minister Gough Whitlam and Margaret Whitlam to a tea party on the lawns of the official
residence.
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This suggests that these symbols may be effective in impressing those who are
expected to submit to imperial or judicial power. There is also evidence that the
powerful believe they are effective. The Solicitor General’s advice and the
political debate which formed its context discussed the referent of the symbols,
i.e. the British monarch or the State government, which I considered above.
What was left out of his discussion, indeed of any of the debate around which
coat of arms should be used in New South Wales courts, is the seeming
necessity to have some coat of arms. The different symbols of the State and the
Royal arms signify different places (Britain or New South Wales) and different
sovereign powers (the Queen or the New South Wales government). What is it
about a coat of arms which makes it, as I noted above, the sine qua non of
judicial power in New South Wales?
I have already argued that physical presence is an important attribute of any coat
of arms. I want now to emphasise another characteristic common at least to
these two coats of arms, their ancient and relatively obscure iconography: both
heraldic and linguistic. Neither the Solicitor General nor the Ministers nor the
magistrate compared unicorns with kangaroos, rising suns with crowns, nor
harps with sheep. Nor did they discuss the content of the mottos or their
preferences for Latin or old French. These are the elements which differ
between the two symbols, yet they are also share the common element of
heraldic symbols and dead languages. An oath expressed in contemporary,
albeit legal or ceremonial, English has contemporary meaning and reference
which is avoided by the use of obscure languages.
Both coats of arms are characterised by their relative obscurity, and their curious
relationship to law courts and sovereign power. Even translating the mottos from
the old French or the Latin, they are senseless in the context of contemporary
New South Wales law. The unicorn, lions and the kangaroo only become
meaningful when they are identified with a specific monarchy, with a State and its
republican aspirations, or with the totemic power of an indigenous animal. The
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reliance of Australian law officers, from magistrates to the New South Wales
Solicitor General, on obscure symbols of State or Royal authority, suggests that
their very obscurity adds to their power.
The gap between the literal referents of the components of these coats of arms
(unicorns, dead sheep) and any tangible relevance they may have to sovereignty
or judicial power leaves an area of uncertainty. Some social groups or expert
interpreters may have access to an interpretive framework in which unicorns
indicate Scotland and dead sheep the economic might of a rural colony. Others
will be faced with obscurity, or draw on new referents for the interpretation of
symbols.
In New South Wales the contested territory of ethnic identity, British heritage,
republicanism and Australian cultural symbolism has been fought out over the
coat of arms and the appropriate symbol of the power of the state and its courts.
Signs have consequences as a result of the meanings which audiences may
read into them. While the contest over which coat of arms to use indicates the
depth of feeling which each can arose, it has blurred the significance of the coat
of arms as such. Indeed the inconsistent usage in recent court buildings and
refurbishments highlights the interchangeability of these purportedly distinct
symbols.
The gap between the symbol and its apparent, contemporary meaning provides
an opportunity for interpretive plurality, and yet obscurity may have other
outcomes. Obscurity, like meaning, has consequences. The symbol may be
powerful as much for what cannot be interpreted as for what can. Georg Simmel
associated secrecy with social power.
The secret gives one a position of exception…. It is basically independent of the
content it guards. … From secrecy, which shades all that is profound and
significant, grows the typical error according to which everything mysterious is
something important and essential. (Simmel 1950, 332-3)
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Eco uses other parts of this passage in his attack on Hermetic interpretation, ie
overinterpretation. (Eco et al. 1992, 38) It seems to me that this misses Simmel's
point, which is not that obscure symbols may suffer an excess of interpretation,
but rather that they gain a certain form of social power through a paucity of
interpretants, which leads the powerless to doubt their ability to interpret them.
Interpretations may be part of a political project, particularly one which seeks to
capture the power of a traditional or ancient symbol and to invest it with new
meanings. However, the obscurity of ancient objects, symbols and languages
may also gain political power through their lack of contemporary interpretants,
and hence their obscurity.
While competing factions of Anglophiles and republicans have recently fought out
their causes under the banners of the Royal and the State coats of arms, as
symbols of judicial power these symbols have another purchase on political
symbolism. Signifying power itself, in ways which appear ancient and obscure to
the majority of people, the coats of arms continue to exist as signs. But, as signs
which are interpreted through the gaps in their referents rather than through
some transparent interpretive pathway, they are signs of themselves, signs of
their own power.

Endurance

If the efficacy of physical symbols in invoking authority derives from their
obscurity, as Simmel suggests of the secret, the analysis of ancient heraldic
traditions and ooof dead languages indicate that obscurity in turn derives from
the longevity of objects. Endurance has other effects which are not directly
related to obscurity, but rather to physical presence itself.
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In discussing the difference between the verbal oath and the physical coat of
arms I pointed out that the former is only uttered in real time, while the latter
persists. This is also a function of human agency. The oath must be uttered by
a person; it is their commitment to allegiance. It is a performative like the judicial
decision. The human agent who carved or painted the coat of arms, or the one
who fixed it to the wall of the courtroom, may be long gone from that place, yet
the sign remains. It is not apparent who made it or who put it there. In this way it
acquires a semiotic power which is not linked to any individual sign-maker.
The impersonal object manifests that basic aporia of jurisprudence, the rule of
law and not of men. Should we then conclude that the coat of arms has the
effect of masking human agency? If the judge pronounces judgment only in the
presence of this obscure and ancient object, it appears that the object lends its
impersonal and enduring authority to the performance. In identifying this
authority with the state, Michael Taussig calls one of the communicative uses of
signs “state fetishism”, and he quotes Philip Abrams.
[T]he state is not the reality behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the
mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is. … The confusing figure
of the mask is helpful only so long as, instead of trying to rip it off, we recognize
and even empathize with its capacity to confuse, which means we take stock of
the fact that what's important is not that it conceals but that it makes truth.
(Abrams, quoted Taussig 1992, 113)

The sign's meaning is immanent in its effects. If the sign is found to constitute a
social reality regardless of its associations (ancient or contemporary), we know it
by its works. Where the sign is the mask which constitutes the power of the
state, what does the mask conceal if it is doing this work in front of our eyes?
The symbol which constitutes state power is only a mask if it has a hidden
meaning. Interpretation such as that offered by the Solicitor General sees the
constitution of power in a semiotics which discovers in the State coat of arms a
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transcendent meaning of indivisible separation no less mysterious than the Holy
Trinity: the judiciary is part of the combined power of the three arms of
government, yet independent. And yet this is not what the object does in the
courtroom. The object itself may mean nothing or anything: the monarch, the
state or the independent judiciary. If the symbolic object means nothing beyond
its invocation of power, then it is a transparent manifestation of power constituted
in the here and now of each actually existing courtroom.
To say, as Taussig does, that the symbols which invoke state power are
“fetishes” is to associate the modern state with the objects of “primitive” religions.
This was Marx’s rhetorical move in associating the bourgeois means of
production with the commodity fetish. (Mitchell 1996, 190ff) It is mirrored in the
Aboriginal accusation that “these judges [and] coppers” have stolen sacred
animals for their own power. I say mirrored, however, and not reproduced,
because the Aboriginal protest does not try to diminish the bourgeois order by an
association with “fetishism”, but rather tries to reclaim the objects themselves. In
the present analysis I have recognised the power of objects and tried to explain
it. Used in suitably powerful social contexts, objects are equally efficacious in
Aboriginal society and in the colonising society. Indeed the parallels clarify this
efficacy, without debunking or denigrating the objects or the beliefs they sustain.
I said above that consequences may flow from the interpretation of meanings. If
a sign means a monarchist or a republican New South Wales we understand the
content of the sign by the context in which it is used, and the polemics
surrounding its use. Yet I have discussed here a case in which it seems that a
sign’s efficacy has become detached from its denotation of different sources of
authority or allegiance. Different symbols can be used interchangeably to invoke
judicial power, even though the signs may “mean” allegiance to a British Queen
or a republican cause. In this situation we see that different signs may have the
same effect–the invocation of judicial power–despite various different prior
associations.
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To return to the ways of interpreting signs with which I began this discussion, of
course meaning is constituted both through cultural association and pragmatic
effect. This example of symbols bearing different associations with the same
effect suggests the possibility of disjuncture between the interpretive regimes of
antecedent association and consequential effect. By drawing attention to the
obscurity of the associations behind these signs, together with the immanence of
their physical presence and invocation of power, I have tried to explore the
relationship between an exegetical approach to meanings (from prior
association) and a pragmatic approach (understanding their effects). Where
effect can stay the same despite variations in association, this suggests that the
very obscurity of those associations may be contributing to the effect.
The physical coat of arms is an object which endures over long periods and is
used to invoke judicial power. Its meaning is apparent in this use. As a physical
object of early provenance it not only has ancient, obscure, or ambiguous
associations, but it represents the power of entities which are not present.
Whether this is the power of a monarch, of the state, or of an independent
judiciary, it is not the power of the individual judge qua individual. While the
judicial decision may only be pronounced by such an individual, the invariable
association of this performative with the coat of arms serves to attach the
immediate power of the judge to the enduring power of the object. Likewise, the
enduring power of the object invokes an impersonal authority with every judicial
pronouncement.
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